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Abstract In the present study, we investigated the conditions
in which rewarded distractors have the ability to capture at-
tention, even when attention is directed toward the target lo-
cation. Experiment 1 showed that when the probability of
obtaining reward was high, all salient distractors captured at-
tention, even when they were not associated with reward. This
effect may have been caused by participants suboptimally
using the 100%-valid endogenous location cue. Experiment
2 confirmed this result by showing that salient distractors did
not capture attention in a block in which no reward was ex-
pected. In Experiment 3, the probability of the presence of a
distractor was high, but it only signaled reward availability on
a low number of trials. The results showed that those very
infrequent distractors that signaled reward captured attention,
whereas the distractors (both frequent and infrequent ones) not
associated with reward were simply ignored. The latter exper-
iment indicates that even when attention is directed to a loca-
tion in space, stimuli associated with reward break through the
focus of attention, but equally salient stimuli not associated
with reward do not.
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Attentional control
Classic models of attention have long stated that two indepen-
dent control mechanisms are instrumental for attentional guid-
ance to visual stimuli or events in our immediate
surroundings. One control mechanism is assumed to be vol-
untary and top-down, whereas the other is assumed to be
automatic and bottom-up in origin. The interaction between
these mechanisms influences the way we perceive the world
by selecting stimuli for further processing on the basis of our
current goals (top-down) or of the stimulus’s physical saliency
in the environment (bottom-up). These models of attention
have been studied extensively and have long been considered
the only mechanisms responsible for attentional selection (for
reviews of the matter, see Corbetta & Shulman, 2002;
Theeuwes, 2010; Theeuwes, Olivers, & Belopolsky, 2010).
The strict dichotomy of attentional control mechanisms
was called into question when converging evidence was pro-
vided for a third category of attentional control, termed
Bselection history^ (Awh, Belopolsky, & Theeuwes, 2012).
Selection history represents the attentional bias for stimuli or
stimulus features that have been selected as a target in the past.
Clear examples of selection history involve a phenomenon
known as priming of pop-out (Maljkovic & Nakayama,
1994, 1996; Theeuwes & Van der Burg, 2007), reflecting the
observation that visual search is more efficient when the
target-defining feature is repeated on consecutive trials, as
compared to when the target feature changes. This is an im-
portant finding, as these are among the first studies to show
that attention can be allocated by factors other than top-down
or bottom-up control. Furthermore, selection history has been
shown to underlie attentional effects, previously attributed to
top-down control (Belopolsky, Schreij, & Theeuwes, 2010;
Wolfe, Butcher, Lee, & Hyle, 2003; see Theeuwes, 2013, for
a review).
Furthermore, the history of reward associations is a form of
attentional selection based on learned associations between a
stimulus and a received (monetary) reward. The rationale is
that associating a stimulus with a reward boosts its represen-
tation on an attentional priority map, biasing attention toward
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selection of this stimulus (Awh et al., 2012). Similar to the
effects of selection history, attentional guidance by reward is
driven by neither bottom-up nor top-down mechanisms.
Rather, it appears to reflect stimulus history: The mere asso-
ciation of a stimulus with a reward results in attentional cap-
ture by the rewarded stimulus, even when a reward is no
longer available. The effects of reward on attention can be
clearly observed in typical reward tasks (e.g., Anderson,
Laurent, & Yantis, 2011) in which stimuli or stimulus features
are initially associated with a reward (training phase). In a
subsequent testing phase, in which rewards are no longer de-
livered, the crucial observation is that when the rewarded
stimulus is part of the search display (but not the target) it
captures attention, even when it is a nonsalient distractor
(Anderson et al., 2011; Anderson & Yantis, 2012; Failing &
Theeuwes, 2014; Wang, Yu, & Zhou, 2013). This phenome-
non is known as value-driven attentional capture, and these
effects are taken as evidence that stimuli that have been pre-
viously rewarded attract attention because of their learned
associated value.
It should be noted that many reward studies have a training
phase that is separate from the testing phase (e.g., Anderson et
al., 2011; Anderson & Yantis, 2013). Typically, during train-
ing, participants repeatedly select the rewarded color (because
it defines the target and the participant’s subsequent response),
which then during the testing phase has to be ignored (when
the previously rewarded target now appears as the distractor).
As such, in this setup, selection of the rewarded stimulus in the
training phase is pivotal for the outcome of the trial, as it
defines the response given by the participant as well as the
obtained reward. As a consequence of this setup, it has
remained unclear whether and to what extent repeatedly re-
warding stimuli that do not need to be selected for correct task
completion can lead to value-driven attentional capture. To
test whether rewarding the stimulus that defines the response,
and hence whether the outcome of the trial was critical for
value-driven capture, Le Pelley Pearson, Griffiths, and
Beesley (2015) had participants perform a visual search task
in which a shape singleton defined the target and a colored
distractor singleton signaled the magnitude of the reward that
could be earned on that particular trial if observers were to
select the target accurately and fast enough. Importantly, the
color singleton that signaled the amount of reward was never
the target, and its selection was never predictive of the correct
response. In fact, selecting the distractor was detrimental to
obtaining a reward, due to reaction time limitations. The re-
sults of Le Pelley and colleagues showed clear value-driven
attentional capture by the distractor stimulus, which cannot be
attributed to an association between the rewarded stimulus and
the correct response and selection criteria of the task.
These findings suggest that when valued distractors are
presented in a search display together with a target, attending
the valued distractor is prioritized over the target, resulting in a
delayed reaction time to the target. Similar effects of reward
on attentional guidance have been observed under varying
experimental conditions, consistently showing that previously
valued stimuli attract attention, regardless of their experimen-
tal status (e.g., whether a stimulus is a target or a distractor;
Anderson & Yantis, 2013; Bucker, Belopolsky, & Theeuwes,
2015; Bucker, Silvis, Donk, & Theeuwes, 2015; Failing &
Theeuwes, 2014; Wang et al., 2013).
The involuntary nature of value-driven attentional capture
parallels the apparent automaticity observed in classic
saliency-driven attentional capture. In his classic work,
Jonides (1981) defined a number of criteria for the automatic-
ity of attentional allocation, suggesting that capture requires a
minimal attentional capacity and is resistant to suppression.
Resistance to suppression reflects the mandatory character of
attentional capture: Even when observers try to ignore the
salient event, they are simply incapable of doing so.
Although attentional capture is often described as an automat-
ic process, Jonides showed that increasing the validity of a
salient spatial cue that indicated the target location resulted
in greater benefits and larger costs for valid and invalid cues,
respectively. This finding suggests that observers may have
some form of control over the extent to which salient events
capture attention.
In line with these observations, Yantis and Jonides
(1990) demonstrated that the effects of attentional cap-
ture by sudden onsets could be completely annulled by
using an effective endogenous location cue. In their stud-
ies, participants had to search for and identify a target
letter presented among distractor letters in a search dis-
play. The target letter could either be an onset letter
among no-onset distractor letters or a no-onset target
letter with one of the distractors being an onset stimulus.
The results showed that reaction times to the target were
not slowed by the onset of a distractor stimulus when a
symbolic cue indicated the target’s location prior to its
onset (Exp. 2), but only when the location cue had a
high validity (Exp. 3).
Theeuwes (1991) showed similar results: Salient events
outside the attentional window (evoked by an endogenous
cue) did not capture attention, whereas events within an atten-
tional window did. These findings are in line with the findings
by Yantis and Jonides (1990), clearly showing that attentional
capture is not completely automatic and can be influenced by
the observer’s top-down attentional set. A reduced attentional
window surrounding the target location has been put forward
as an explanation for the observed reduced saliency-driven
attentional capture (Belopolsky & Theeuwes, 2010;
Belopolsky, Zwaan, Theeuwes, & Kramer, 2007; Theeuwes,
1994). Precueing the target location leads to a smaller atten-
tional window surrounding fixation, and salient distractors
falling outside of the attentional window no longer capture
attention.
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Due to the apparent overlap in the involuntary nature of
both value-driven and saliency-driven attentional capture, the
question arises whether value-associated stimuli can be ig-
nored when observers are strongly focused on a location in
space by an endogenous cue. This relation was recently inves-
tigated byMunneke, Hoppenbrouwers, and Theeuwes (2015),
employing an experimental paradigm in which the location of
a target letter was endogenously precued with 80% validity.
The target could be presented in one of two onscreen place-
holder boxes (left and right of fixation), with a distractor letter
presented in the nontarget box. Critically, one of the two
placeholder boxes would change to a predefined salient color
with the onset of the target, its color reflecting the magnitude
of the reward obtainable on that particular trial. One observa-
tion of this study showed that, when the distractor box
changed to a reward color (turning the box into a valued
distractor), overall slowed reaction times to the target letter
were observed, with the largest increase in reaction times be-
ing for trials in which the color signaled the possibility of high
reward.
The findings observed by Munneke et al. (2015) are not
fully consistent with the observations by Yantis and Jonides
(1990) and Theeuwes (1991), in so far as the study by
Munneke et al. showed attentional capture by salient and
rewarded stimuli despite endogenously focused attention at
the target location. The studies by Theeuwes (1991) and
Yantis and Jonides (1990) did not show attentional capture
by abrupt onset distractors when a 100%-valid cue informed
participants in advance of the location of the upcoming target.
This discrepancy between value-driven and saliency-driven
capture may indicate that value-associated stimuli occupy a
preferred position on an attentional priority map, in compari-
son to salient stimuli. However, Munneke and colleagues’
study may not have been the most optimal way to study the
influence of top-down attention on reward processing during
visual search, since only two locations were used, not realis-
tically representing the attentional constraints observed during
visual search. Furthermore, an endogenous cue was used that
did not predict the location of the target with 100% validity. In
the present study, we aimed to investigate the relationship
between attentional allocation due to reward history and top-
down attentional allocation. More specifically, we addressed
the question of whether value-driven attentional capture oc-
curs under conditions in which participants canmake use of an
effective cue informing them of an upcoming target location.
In other words, do distractors associated with reward break
through the attentional focus?
In the present work, we used a design based on the study by
Le Pelley and colleagues (2015), and added a 100%-valid
endogenous spatial cue to the design, presented well before
target onset. In this way, we were able to gauge the influence
of top-down attention on value-driven attentional allocation. If
valued distractors exert a stronger influence on attentional
mechanisms compared to nonrewarded salient distractors,
then we might expect capture to still occur, despite focused
attention.
Experiment 1
In the first experiment, we investigated whether attentional
capture by valued distractors occurs when attention is fully
focused on the target location by an endogenous cue (a pointer
indicating the location of the target). Using an arrow to direct
attention in advance to a location in space has been used in
many studies as a way to endogenously manipulate spatial
attention (see Jonides, 1981; Koelewijn, Bronkhorst, &
Theeuwes, 2009; Theeuwes, 1991; Theeuwes & Van der
Burg, 2007; Yantis & Jonides, 1990). Note, however, that
some studies (e.g., Ristic & Kingstone, 2012) have shown that
overlearned symbols such as arrows and possibly also pointers
(as we used here) may result in orienting that is at least partly
automatic. Regardless of whether orienting is purely endoge-
nous (and/or partly automatic), using a cue before a display
onset is an adequate way to manipulate the allocation of at-
tention in the visual field.
Method
Participants We tested 12 participants (seven females, five
males; mean age ± standard deviation: 25.5 ± 4.9 years) with
normal or corrected-to-normal vision and no history of mental
illness. All participants gave written informed consent prior to
the start of the experiment. For their participation, a monetary
reward was provided. The experimental procedures of this and
all subsequent experiments were approved by the local ethics
committee and were in accordance with the Declaration of
Helsinki.
Stimuli and procedure Participants were seated in a dimly lit
room 75 cm from a Samsung Syncmaster 2233monitor with a
22-in. diagonal. All of the stimuli were created and presented
using Psychophysics Toolbox 3.0.12 (Brainard, 1997; Pelli,
1997) for MATLAB 2014a (MathWorks, Inc.). Eye move-
ments were monitored using an EyeLink 1000 eyetracker
(SR Research, Oakville, Ontario, Canada). A chinrest was
used to assure a fixed viewing distance.
The time courses of typical trials in Experiment 1 are illus-
trated in Fig. 1. Each trial was initiated by presenting a blank
screen for 500 ms containing only a fixation dot (0.3°).
Subsequently, eight circles (1.6° in diameter) surrounding fix-
ation (radius 5.4°) would appear indicating the possible target
locations. Each circle contained a figure-8 placeholder (0.8° ×
0.5°) to be substituted with a letter at a later moment in the
trial. Next, participants were shown an endogenous cue in the
form of a small line-arrow (0.8°), which indicated the location
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of the upcoming target with 100% validity. After 750 ms, the
placeholders turned into letters. The target letter, indicated by
the cue, would turn into the letter BP^ or BS,^ whereas the
remaining letters turned into the letters BE^ or BH.^ The target
and distractor letters stayed on the screen until the participant
had responded to the identity of the target stimulus by pressing
one of two predefined keys on a standard keyboard (Bz^ key
for S, Bm^ key for P) or until 1.5 s had passed. A reward
screen would then appear, informing the participants about
the number of points won on the trial. Prior to the start of
the experiment, participants were instructed to respond as
quickly as possible and not to make eye movements. In addi-
tion, they were informed that the cue was 100% valid and that
the magnitude of the reward on each trial was dependent on
the stimuli on the screen, their accuracy, and the speed of their
responses. No further details were given with regard to the
reward.
Two different trial types were used throughout the experi-
ment. First, during an onset trial, simultaneously with reveal-
ing the target and distractor letters (by removing some of the
line segments of the figure-8 premasks), a colored distractor
would appear. The colored onset consisted of a circle present-
ed at a random position between two of the original stimulus
positions and never contained the target letter. On no-onset
trials, an additional gray circle was present throughout the trial
(see Theeuwes et al., 1999, who used a similar procedure).
Similar to the other nontarget locations, this additional circle
contained a placeholder stimulus that subsequently changed
into a distractor letter at the moment the other placeholders
changed into letters. The target location and the location of the
additional stimulus in both trials types were counterbalanced
over the experiment and occurred equally often at each
location.
Importantly, prior work has shown that two stimuli present-
ed close together will vie for neural representation. This com-
petition is resolved (biased) by attention (Desimone, 1998;
Desimone & Duncan, 1995). However, biased competition
may entail that stimuli presented close together are processed
in a qualitatively different manner than stimuli presented far-
ther apart. Therefore, given the present design, in which the
target and distractor could be presented next to each other, any
influence of a closely proximate distractor on target process-
ing does not need to reflect attentional capture. Instead, it may
reflect the processes involved in resolving competition be-
tween the target and distractor. For this reason, all analyses
in the Results sections for this and the following experiments
have the trials removed in which target and distractor were
presented directly next to each other.
Crucially, the distractor in the onset condition could be pre-
sented in three different yet equiluminant colors (red, green,
and blue: 31.3 cd/m2). The remaining stimuli were presented
in a light shade of gray (63 cd/m2). All stimuli were presented
on a light gray background with an overall luminance of 26 cd/
m2. These colors, which were counterbalanced over partici-
pants, indicated the magnitude of the reward that could be
obtained on that particular trial with 100% certainty. Three
Fig. 1 Time courses of two trial
types in Experiment 1. The time
course depicted on the left reflects
the trials in which a valued onset
distractor appeared with target
presentation, and the time course
depicted on the right shows the
no-onset condition
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reward levels were used: high reward (10 points), low reward (2
points), and no reward (0 points). These points translated to real
money paid at the end of the experiment. However, a reward
could only be obtained if the participant responded accurately
and within 800 ms after target onset. If participants responded
incorrectly or slower than 800ms, no reward was administered.
In the no-onset condition, participants would always obtain 0
points, as in the no-reward condition.
The experimental design consisted of six blocks of 128
trials, preceded by 30 practice trials. The four reward condi-
tions occurred equally often and were mixed within blocks
(three reward onset conditions and a no-reward, no-onset con-
dition; 25% trials per condition). The entire experiment took
approximately 80 min to complete.
Results
Reaction times Trials in which participants made eye
movements larger than 1.25° away from fixation were
discarded from the dataset (12.8%). Reaction times in-
cluded in the analyses were derived from trials in which
participants responded correctly (9.4% discarded) and
with reaction times between 200 and 1,000 ms (fewer
than 1% discarded). To gain a better understanding of
how reward influences attentional allocation given full
advance knowledge of the target’s location, a repeated
measures analysis of variance (ANOVA) on the reaction
times obtained in the experiment was performed. Figure
2 shows the mean reaction times per condition (top
panel). Trial Type (high-reward, low-reward, no-reward,
and no-onset) was used as a within-subjects factor. The
results showed a main effect of trial type [F(3, 33) =
4.477, p = .01, ηp
2 = .289, power = .838], indicating
that participants did not respond equally quickly in all
conditions. To investigate the amounts of capture for the
different conditions, we used paired-samples t tests to
compare the reaction times obtained for the different
reward levels with those obtained in the no-onset con-
dition. The results of these planned comparisons showed
that all salient distractors captured attention. At each
reward level, including the no-reward condition, reaction
times were significantly slower than in the no-onset
condition [no onset, 519 ms; high reward, 532 ms,
t(11) = 2.586, p = .025; low reward, 530 ms, t(11) =
3.107, p = .01; no reward, 531 ms, t(11) = 3.484, p =
.005]. An additional one-way ANOVA comparing the
conditions in which a rewarded distractor was presented
showed no differences in reaction times between the
different reward levels (F < 1).
Accuracy A repeated measures ANOVA with Reward
Level as a within-subjects factor on the accuracy data
did not yield any significant differences between the
Fig. 2 Mean reaction times (top)
and accuracy scores (bottom) per
reward condition. Bars represent
the 95% confidence intervals for
within-subjects designs (Morey,
2008)
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reward levels (F < 1). Figure 2 shows the average ac-
curacies per condition (bottom panel).
Discussion
The results of Experiment 1 showed attentional capture for all
conditions in which a salient onset distractor appeared, as
compared to a no-onset condition. No differences in reaction
times between any of the reward levels were observed. A
straightforward explanation of these findings suggests that,
despite participants being fully aware of the target location
in advance, salient distractors still captured attention.
However, this finding is not consistent with previous work
that has repeatedly shown that salient stimuli falling outside
the attentional window do not capture attention (Belopolsky&
Theeuwes, 2010; Belopolsky et al., 2007; Theeuwes, 1991;
Yantis & Jonides, 1990). This discrepancy may be explained
by the role of reward in the present experiment. Since partic-
ipants could obtain (different levels of) reward on each trial
and might have preferred to monitor this information, they
may not have optimally used the cue to focus attention on
the target location. Reward-seeking behavior, the tendency
to find and select stimuli associated with reward, may result
in a less focused attention on the target location. Because
attention is not fully focused on the target location, all salient
stimuli, including distractors that are not associated with re-
ward, will capture attention. In short, the presence of a possi-
ble reward evokes a reward-seeking attentional set at the cost
of focused attention, which allows any salient distractor to
capture attention. Note that this reasoning suggests that the
presence of a possible reward-signaling stimulus leads to an
attentional set that results in capture. Given that participants
always knew the location of the target in advance, to further
test the hypothesis that salient distractors only capture atten-
tion when they are associated with reward, we blocked the
reward and no-reward conditions in Experiment 2.
Experiment 2
The findings of Experiment 1 indicated that when obtaining a
reward is possible, top-down cues are not used to their full
extent. Despite our use of a 100%-valid cue, attention may not
have been fully focused on the target location, leading to
saliency-driven attentional capture. This would be consistent
with Yantis and Jonides (1990), who showed that only when
observers fully focus their attention do abrupt onsets cease to
capture attention. Indeed, in their 75%-and-25% validity con-
dition, participants adopted a more diffuse mode of attentional
allocation, leading to attentional capture by abrupt onsets.
An alternative explanation is that the results we obtained in
Experiment 1 might be attributed to the type of distractors we
used. The reward-signaling distractors were singletons
varying along two dimensions (onset and color), making them
more salient than the stimuli used by Yantis and Jonides
(1990). The highly salient nature of the current distractors
could have resulted in attentional capture, despite focused
attention at the cued target location and independent of any
reward-induced top-down set. If a claim can be made that the
possibility of reward leads to attentional capture, further re-
sults should show differences in reaction times between trials
that lead to reward and those that do not.
In Experiment 2, the ability to obtain a rewardwas blocked.
In this way, capture by salient distractors with and without a
reward-seeking attentional set could be investigated. If the
possibility of reward leads to an attenuated use of the endog-
enous cue, then no attentional capture would be expected in
blocks without reward administration (as in Yantis & Jonides,
1990, and Theeuwes, 1991). Additionally, attentional capture
by salient distractors might still occur in blocks in which re-
ward was associated with these stimuli.
Method
The overall methods used in Experiment 2 were highly similar
to those used in Experiment 1, with a number of small
changes.
Participants Twelve participants were tested (nine females,
three males; mean age ± standard deviation: 24.5 ± 3.3 years)
after providing written informed consent. A monetary reim-
bursement was provided at the end of the experiment, based
on time spent on the task and the reward obtained during the
task.
Stimuli and procedure The stimuli used in Experiment 2
were identical to those in Experiment 1. One major change
was made to the procedure: The no-reward and reward condi-
tions were tested in separate blocks. In the no-reward blocks, a
salient distractor that was not associated with a reward ap-
peared at a novel location together with the onset of the target
letter (i.e., 0 points were obtained at the end of the trial). In
order to keep motivation levels comparable to those in the
reward blocks, participants were shown a reward feedback
screen after every 16 trials. Only when participants performed
with an accuracy of 80% or higher was a reward given to the
participant. Crucially, the reward was not dependent on the
colors presented in those 16 trials, and participants were spe-
cifically informed of this. In the reward blocks, two differently
colored salient stimuli were used as distractors, reflecting ei-
ther a high (10 points) or a low (2 points) reward. Reward
level (high, low) was mixed within a reward block, with each
level occurring equally often. As in Experiment 1, participants
were informed that the magnitude of the reward in the reward
blocks depended on the stimuli on the screen. However, no
explicit link between a type of color and the associated reward
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magnitude was mentioned. In both block types (reward, no-
reward), no-onset trials were mixed with the onset trials in
order to provide the appropriate baseline. The no-reward part
of the experiment consisted of two blocks of 128 trials, where-
as the reward part of the experiment consisted of four blocks
of 128 trials. A short practice block of 32 trials preceded both
the reward and the no-reward blocks. In both block types,
25% of the trials consisted of no-onset trials, whereas the
remaining trials contained a salient distractor. The distribu-
tions of singleton trials were 75% no-reward trials in the no-
reward blocks, and 37.5% high- and 37.5% low-reward trials
in the reward blocks. In a counterbalanced fashion, partici-
pants would start with either the reward blocks or the no-
reward blocks. The task was the same as in Experiment 1.
Again, all analyses for this experiment have the trials removed
in which target and distractor were presented directly next to
each other.
Results
Reaction times Trials on which the participant made eye
movements more than 1.25° away from fixation were
discarded from the data set (8.6%). The reaction times includ-
ed in the analyses were based on trials in which the partici-
pants responded correctly (6.5% discarded) and with a reac-
tion time between 200 and 1,000 ms (fewer than 1%
discarded). To understand how the likelihood of obtaining a
reward influences attentional allocation, we compared the re-
action times observed in the different trial types (see Fig. 3,
top panel). An initial ANOVAwith only Trial Type as a factor
(no-reward blocks: onset, no onset; reward blocks: low re-
ward, high reward, no onset) showed a significant difference
among all conditions [F(4, 44) = 3.617, p = .049, ηp
2 = .247,
power = .579, Huynh–Feldt corrected]. The crucial question
in Experiment 2 was to what extent salient distractors would
show capture given differential reward conditions. To investi-
gate this, planned paired-samples t tests were performed com-
paring the no-onset conditions with the onset conditions for
the different block types. First, no difference was observed
between the no-onset trials and the salient no-reward trials in
the no-reward blocks [502 and 501 ms, respectively; t(11) =
0.110, p = .915], clearly showing that no attentional capture
was observed within this condition.1 However, in the reward
blocks, clear attentional capture was observed in both high-
and low-reward trials. In both cases, the presence of a
rewarded salient distractor significantly increased reaction
times, relative to the no-onset condition [508 ms; high reward,
516 ms, t(11) = 2.226, p = .048; low reward, 517 ms, t(11) =
5.275, p < .001]. No difference in reaction times was observed
between high- and low-reward trials (F < 1), suggesting that
high- and low-reward-associated distractors were equally like-
ly to capture in the present paradigm.
Accuracy As in Experiment 1, no differences in accuracy
were observed in a repeated measures ANOVA with Trial
Type as within-subjects factor [F(4, 44) = 1.141, p = .350,
ηp
2 = .094, power = .328]. Figure 3 shows the average accu-
racies per condition (bottom panel).
Discussion
The present results clearly show that in blocks with no reward,
the salient onset distractor did not capture attention. This is in
line with classic findings that have shown that attentional cap-
ture is eliminated when attention is allocated at the upcoming
target location (Theeuwes, 1991; Yantis & Jonides, 1990).
However, small but significant attentional capture was ob-
served in the reward blocks. These results suggest that, despite
participants being informed with 100% accuracy where the
target will be presented, salient stimuli still capture attention
when a reward can be obtained. As in Experiment 1, no dif-
ferences in reaction times between high- and low-reward trials
were observed. This finding further suggests that the presence
of reward might alter the observer’s strategy, such that the
100%-valid cue is not used optimally. Critically, not using
the cue and engaging in a reward-seeking strategy might be
detrimental to obtaining the actual reward, as a result of the
search-induced increased reaction times. Thus, the presence of
reward leads to altered search strategies, subsequently leading
to attentional capture by salience. Any direct effects of reward
on attention (i.e., value-driven attentional capture) in this ex-
periment were obscured by these altered search strategies. In
order to investigate whether value-driven attentional capture
occurs despite full knowledge of the target location, a third
experiment was run to force participants to use the cue, which
then might discourage reward-seeking behavior.
Experiment 3
Experiment 1 and 2 showed that the possibility of obtaining
reward can lead to attentional capture by any salient stimulus,
regardless of its associated value. However, in order to inves-
tigate whether stimuli associated with reward can have a more
direct influence on attentional allocation (i.e., whether a
rewarded salient stimulus breaks through attentional focus,
whereas an equally salient but nonrewarded stimulus does
1 Because the salient distractor in the no-reward block always had the
same color, it can be argued that the lack of an effect was caused by a
suppression of the distractor color, due to negative intertrial priming for
trials on which the distractor was repeated (see Theeuwes & Van der
Burg, 2011). However, no differences in reaction times were observed
between trials on which the distractor was repeated versus not repeated (p
= .48). Neither trial type (repeated and not-repeated distractor) yielded
reaction times that were significantly different from those in the no-onset
condition in the no-reward block (ps = .79 and .52, respectively).
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not), we used a design in which the probability of the presence
of a distractor was high but the distractor only signaled reward
availability on a low number of trials. The low frequency of
trials in which a reward could be obtained should discourage
the participants from engaging in reward-seeking behavior. If
value-driven attentional capture breaks through the focus of
attention, then capture would only occur with the low-
frequency reward-signaling distractor, but not with any other
similarly salient distractor.
Method
The same general paradigm used in Experiment 1 was used in
Experiment 3, as well. A number of changes were made to
discourage the reward-seeking strategy observed in
Experiments 1 and 2.
Participants Twenty-four participants (15 females, nine
males; mean age ± standard deviation: 23.8 ± 3.4 years) took
part in Experiment 3. All gave written informed consent prior
to the start of the experiment. As in the earlier experiments,
participants were awarded a monetary compensation at the
end of the experiment based on the duration and the obtained
reward during the experiment.
Stimuli and procedure A number of small changes were
made to the procedure of Experiment 3. First, the reward
reaction time cutoff was decreased from 800 to 600 ms:
Only when participants responded correctly and faster than
600 ms after target onset could a reward be obtained. This
changewasmade so that engaging in reward-seeking behavior
would be more detrimental for obtaining a reward. It further
enforced the use of the endogenous cue, since its use would
lead to faster reaction times. Three different distractor colors
were used in the experiment, but only one of the colors led to a
high reward (+10 points). The other two colors were used as
no-reward colors. A high reward could be obtained only on
12.5% of the trials, which discouraged the reward-seeking
strategy. One of the two no-reward colors was presented with
the same low frequency (12.5%), allowing for a comparison
of reward effects to effects induced by low-frequent stimuli
(novelty, oddball; see Neo & Chua, 2006). The remaining no-
reward color was presented with a high frequency (50% of the
trials). All trial types were mixed within a block. As in
Experiments 1 and 2, no-onset trials were present on 25% of
the trials. Note that 87.5% of the trials were unrewarded, a
design choice aimed at discouraging reward-seeking behavior.
If rewarded stimuli can break through the focus of attention,
then we expected the rewarded stimuli to slow down reaction
times to the target, whereas the low-frequency no-reward
stimulus should not have that effect. On the basis of previous
studies (e.g., Yantis & Jonides, 1990) and Experiment 2, we
did not expect a frequent nonrewarded distractor to capture
attention. All conditions were mixed within the experimental
Fig. 3 Mean reaction times (top)
and accuracy scores (bottom) per
reward condition. Bars represent
the 95% confidence intervals for
within-subjects designs (Morey,
2008). The data on the left side
reflect averages observed in the
no-reward blocks, whereas the
data on the right side reflect
averages from the reward blocks.
Note that both blocks have
independent measures for the
no-onset trials
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blocks. The experiment consisted of 13 blocks of 64 trials,
with the first block being a practice block that was exempt
from all analyses. Trials in which the target and distractor were
presented directly next to each other were not analyzed.
Results
Reaction times Trials on which participants made eye
movements more than 1.25° away from fixation were
discarded from the data set (11.89%). The reaction times
included in the analyses were derived from trials on which
participants responded accurately (13.41% discarded) and
with reaction times between 200 and 1,000 ms (fewer than
1% discarded). Figure 4 (top panel) shows the mean reac-
tion times per condition. An initial ANOVA with
Condition (high-reward, no-reward low-frequency, no-
reward high-frequency, and no-onset) as the only factor
showed that the reaction times differed over conditions
[F(3, 69) = 4.811, p = .007, ηp
2 = .173, power = .836,
Huynh–Feldt corrected]. Planned t tests showed that only
the high-reward condition resulted in slowed reaction
times to the target relative to the no-onset condition [483
and 473 ms, respectively; t(23) = 2.845, p = .009]. The
lack of a difference between the no-onset condition and
the low-frequency no-reward condition [475 ms; t(23) =
0.854, p = .402], as well as the nonsignificant difference
between the no-onset condition and the high-frequency no-
reward condition [476 ms; t(23) = 1.284, p = .212], indi-
cates that participants were optimally using the cue, as no
capture was observed in these conditions (Theeuwes,
1991; Yantis & Jonides, 1990).
To investigate the effects of the different distractor
types on overall reaction times, a second ANOVA was
run with Distractor Condition (reward, low-frequency
distractor, and high-frequency distractor) as a factor.
The no-onset trials were not included in this analysis.
The results of this analysis showed a main effect of
distractor condition [F(2, 46) = 4.643, p = .015, ηp
2 =
.168, power = .755]. Planned paired-samples t tests
showed that rewarded distractors yielded slower reac-
tion times to the target than did both low-frequency
distractors [t(23) = 2.313, p = .030] and high-
frequency distractors [t(23) = 2.638, p = .015]. No
difference in reaction times was observed between
the two nonrewarded distractor colors [t(23) = 0.294,
p = .771]. Overall, these results clearly show that
rewarded stimuli capture attention, despite participants
fully utilizing the endogenous cue, as reflected by the
absence of capture in the nonreward conditions.
Accuracy An ANOVA on the accuracy data, with Trial Type
as a within-subjects factor, did not show significant differ-
ences between the different reward conditions in Experiment
Fig. 4 Mean reaction times (top)
and accuracy scores (bottom) per
reward condition. Bars represent
the 95% confidence intervals for
within-subjects designs (Morey,
2008)
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3 (F < 1). Figure 4 (bottom panel) shows the average accuracy
levels per condition.
Discussion
The lack of attentional capture for abrupt onsets not associated
with reward indicates that participants must have used the cue
to optimally focus attention on the location of the upcoming
target. Indeed, Yantis and Jonides (1990) demonstrated that if
attention is not fully focused in advance on the upcoming
target location (their Exp. 2) and if the cue is not 100% valid
(but instead is 75% valid; their Exp. 3), abrupt onsets show a
strong attentional capture effect. Because in our experiment
abrupt onsets ceased to capture attention, we have to conclude
that attention was highly focused in advance at the target lo-
cation. Crucially, at the same time that participants were in the
fully focused state, a distractor signaling high reward did cap-
ture attention, as reaction times for this condition were elevat-
ed relative to the no-reward onset distractor conditions. We
conclude that capture by abrupt onset distractors is fundamen-
tally different from capture by distractors that signal reward,
because distractors that signal reward break through the focus
of attention, whereas distractors not associated with reward
cease to capture attention when endogenous attention is en-
gaged at a location in space.
General discussion
In the present study, we investigated whether valued
distractors capture attention, given that participants were in-
formed about the location of the upcoming target with 100%
validity. In Experiment 1, we showed that despite our cueing
the target location, all salient stimuli captured attention, re-
gardless of whether or not they were associated with a reward.
In Experiment 2, reward delivery was blocked. The results
showed that salient distractors only captured attention when
participants were engaged in a reward block, whereas capture
ceased to exist when participants could not obtain a reward. In
Experiment 3, participants were encouraged to utilize the en-
dogenous cue by providing reward on only a small percentage
of the trials, whereas a distractor was presented on a high
percentage of all trials. Our results showed attentional capture
only when a reward-associated distractor was presented, but
not when an equally salient and infrequent no-reward
distractor was presented.
The results of Experiment 1 appear to be at odds with those
observed in a previous study by Munneke and colleagues
(2015). In this study, the location of the upcoming target was
cued with a validity of 80%, which is unlike the 100% validity
(certainty) used in the present study. In addition, similar to the
setup in the present study, in this previous study a salient outline
signaled the magnitude that could be obtained on that particular
trial. However, despite the lower validity of the cue, in the
previous study, the salient items were not all equally likely to
produce capture. The strongest effects of capture were observed
for highly rewarded stimuli, and less or no capture was ob-
served for low-rewarded stimuli. One would have expected that
using a cue with a lower validity would result in participants
being even more susceptible to saliency-driven capture, but this
was not the case in the previous work. A number of possible
reasons could explain the discrepancy between the present
Experiment 1 and the results of Munneke et al. (2015).
First, Munneke et al. (2015) used a spatial cueing task with
only two possible target locations. In the present study, eight
possible locations were used, which significantly reduced ex-
pectations about the possible target location. A second crucial
difference between the present study and the previous study is
that in the present study, the target letter remained onscreen
until a response was given. In the previous study, the target
remained onscreen for only 200 ms. The longer presentation
time for the target may have led to a different strategy, because
even after participants had directed attention to the distractor,
the target was still present on the screen. This strategy was not
an option in the previous experiments, since the target was not
present on the screen for a long enough period of time. These
two factors (and the fact that the cue validity in the previous
study was 80% instead of 100%) may have contributed to the
attentional differences observed in in these two studies.
The results obtained in this study describe two independent
ways in which reward can influence top-down attentional con-
trol settings. Reward may have both direct and indirect effects
on attention. The indirect effect of reward on top-down atten-
tion can be observed in Experiments 1 and 2, in which we
showed that the possibility of obtaining a reward leads to
participants altering their search strategies, such that a
100%-valid location cue is suboptimally used in favor of
reward-seeking strategies. Despite their making use of the
cue, as indexed by the lack of attentional capture in the no-
reward blocks of Experiment 2, attentional resources in the
reward blocks remained available for processing the reward
stimuli. The cue-induced attentional window was likely not
small enough to merely encompass the target, but was large
enough to encompass all stimuli presented onscreen, includ-
ing salient distractors. This, in turn, led to classic bottom-up
attentional capture by salient distractors. Both Experiments 1
and 2 showed that when reward can be obtained, all salient
distractors capture attention, including no-reward distractors.
However, Experiment 2 further showed that when participants
were aware that they could not obtain a reward, bottom-up
attentional capture was no longer present. Thus, the indirect
way in which reward influences top-down attentional control
settings refers to a strategic top-down setting in which residual
attentional resources remain available for reward-seeking be-
havior. Due to this availability, classic saliency-driven,
bottom-up capture occurs.
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Experiment 3 showed the direct way in which reward can
change top-down attentional settings. When the chances of
obtaining a reward were relatively low (due to the low frequen-
cy of high-reward trials), participants did not engage in reward-
seeking behavior, as they fully focused their attention on the
cued location. Again, in this condition, the salient distractors
did not capture attention anymore (see also Theeuwes, 1991;
Yantis & Jonides, 1990). However, under these circumstances,
while participants were in a fully focused state, reward-
signaling stimuli did still capture attention. The presence of
value-associated distractors was able to break through attention-
al top-down settings in an involuntary and automatic way.
The indirect means of value-driven attentional guidance
should not be mistaken with the motivational aspects of
value-driven attention. Prior work has shown that the likeli-
hood of a reward influences task performance, due to either
improved motor preparation and execution (Mir et al., 2011)
or cognitive factors such as enhanced attentional processes
(Sawaki, Luck, & Raymond, 2015; Small et al., 2005).
However, in these and other studies of reward-induced moti-
vation, participants were fully aware of the reward that could
be obtained on each trial, through either trial-by-trial reward
cueing or blocking reward distribution in the experimental
design. In the present study, effects of motivation seem un-
likely, since participants became slower, rather than faster,
when reward could be obtained. Even in the reward blocks
of Experiment 2, in which participants could obtain a reward
in 75% of the trials, a slowing down of reaction times was still
observed. This indicates that a mechanism qualitatively differ-
ent from motivation was influencing attentional allocation.
Nonoptimized use of the endogenous cue was proposed as
an explanation, which in turn would alter the size of the atten-
tional window such that attentional resources would be allo-
cated to salient distractors, leading to bottom-up attentional
capture. Therefore, it appears that the effects obtained in
Experiments 1 and 2 reflect an interaction between bottom-
up and top-down attentional processes.
In contrast, the direct influence on attention, observed
in Experiment 3, was caused by the reward properties of
the stimulus, much like classic bottom-up attention. The
observer’s attention was involuntarily and automatically
drawn to the rewarded stimuli in the visual field, despite
attending a different target location. The observation that
rewarded stimuli can attract attention when it is already
endogenously deployed at a different target location is
important, given earlier findings that salient (but unreward-
ed) stimuli do not capture attention under stringent top-
down settings (Belopolsky & Theeuwes, 2010; Theeuwes,
1991; Yantis & Jonides, 1990). Theeuwes and colleagues
(Belopolsky & Theeuwes, 2010; Belopolsky et al., 2007;
Theeuwes, 1994, 2004) have argued that the lack of at-
tentional capture by salient items is related to the size of
the attentional window.
When attention is focused on a fixed location (e.g., a
cued target location), the window of attentional modula-
tion is narrow and only encompasses the location around
attentional fixation. Any sudden stimulus onset falling
outside the attentional window therefore will not capture
attention. Nevertheless, the present experiment shows that
when an unexpected rewarded and salient stimulus falls
outside of the attentional window, it will still capture at-
tention, seemingly breaking through the focus of atten-
tion. This difference in terms of capture sets value-
driven attentional capture apart from saliency-driven at-
tentional capture, such that salient items that have been
associated with reward capture attention, despite prior al-
location of attention to the target location, whereas salient
items that are not associated with reward do not.
Importantly, both distractor types were physically salient,
and we cannot rule out that the observed effect was par-
tially driven by the physical salience of the stimuli, most
likely interacting with reward. What is important is that
where a salient distractor could otherwise be ignored, the
availability of reward ensured that this was no longer the
case. A similar point can be made for the low-frequency
or novel stimuli: Perhaps direct effects of reward on at-
tention (while attention is voluntarily engaged at a possi-
ble target location) only occur when reward is combined
with a stimulus that is presented rather infrequently. However,
note that low frequency alone is not enough for capture to
occur, as we showed in Experiment 3. This indicates that the
low frequency of the distractor presentation is not what drives
this effect, but instead the reward that it signals. Yet the crucial
difference between the two distractor types is the association
with reward that causes the observed increased reaction times,
emphasizing the importance of reward associations in atten-
tional guidance. Although a similar attentional mechanism
may subserve both attentional phenomena, it is clear that
value-driven attention is less influenced by a prior top-down
attentional set. That is, rewarded salient stimuli appear to be
strongly manifested on a hypothesized priority map, as com-
pared to salient stimuli, leading to a quantitatively stronger
influence on where attention is allocated.
Finally, because we did not employ separate training and
testing phases in the present study, it can be argued that the
salient distractor was not just reward-related, but also contained
feedback about task performance. This feedback, rather than
the reward history of the salient stimuli, may have led to atten-
tional capture. However, in the present study, attending the
distractor that signaled reward was counterproductive to the
task at hand. Participants were required to search for the target
and give a response. Orienting to a distractor would render this
task less efficient and would decrease the chance of obtaining a
reward (since attending the distractor would result is less opti-
mal performance). Attending to the reward information was
therefore not task relevant.
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